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Summary  findings
Many  manufacturers  in developing  countries  produce  Trhey confirm  strong  scale economies  in internal  power
their  own  electricity  because  the  pubiic  supply  is  production  in both  Nigeria  and  Indonesia.  Shadow  price
unavailable  or  unreliable.  analysis  for both  countries  shows  that  smaller  firms
Lee, Anas,  Verma,  and Murray  develop  a model  of the  would  pay much  more  for  public  power  than  larger  firms
firm  in which  electricity  is produced  internally,  with  scale  would.  Instead  of giving quantity  discounts,  public
economies.  The  model  explains  the  observed  behavior  monopolies  should  charge  the  larger  firms  more  and  the
(prevalent  in Nigeria,  common  in Indonesia,  and  rare  in  smaller  firms  less than  they  presently  charge.
Thailand)  that  firms  supplement  their  purchases  of  In Nigeria,  the  large firms  would  make  intensive  use of
publicly  produced  electricity  with electricity  produced  their  idle generating  capacity,  while  in Indonesia  they
internally.  would  expand  their  tacilities.
T-o prepare  an econometric  estimate,  they  specify  a  In both  counatries, small  uLsers would  realize  savings by
translog  model.  In Nigeria,  where  firms  exhibit  excess  having  rt, rely  less or  expensive  endogenous  power.
capacity,  generators  are  treated  as a fixed  input,  whereas
in Indonesia,  where  firms are expandinig,  they  are
variable.
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Most developing  countries  are characterized  by deficiencies  of various degrees in the
infrastructure services  produced  and delivered  by the public sector. Deficiencies  are observed
in electricity, water, telephone  service, transport services  and waste disposal.
In rapidly growing countries (such as those of the Pacific Rim), deficiencies occur
because the rapid growth in the demand  for infrastructure  congests the capacity of the public
sector to deliver services  of a uniform  quality.  Elsewhere  (as in Sub-Saharan  Africa)  deficiencies
can be due to a combination  of rapid  growth  in urban  areas and a lack of equipment,  spare parts
and adequately trained  personnel  in the public sector.
Firms-can adjust to infrastructure  deficiencies  in a number  of ways. Perhaps, the most
obvious  form of adjustment  is that a business  remains "captive"  to the inadequate  public service,
incurring the higher costs associated  with the unreliability  of such service. A second type of
response occurs when the  firm tries to achieve self-sufficiency  by producing their entire
infrastructure  need  within the plant. Usually,  such  a firm incurs  a much higher unit cost because
it cannot match the scale economies  which  are available  to the public sector.
A third and more interesting  response  entails  a compromise  between  "captivity"  and "self
sufficiency". In the case of electric power, the firm blends two types of power:  the public
power source which is cheap but of lower  quality  (e;g. subject  to more voltage fluctuations)  and
its own in-house power which is more expensive  but of a higher quality.
Households,  as well as firms, must choose how to adapt to infrastructure inadequacies.
Like firms, households  can choose  among  remaining  captive  to inadequate  public service, opting
for self-sufficiency,  and blending  public  and own  provision.  For example, in Nigeria, in the case2
of electricity, most households  opt for captive status, and few for self-sufficiency, but  a
surprisingly  large proportion of wealthy  households  opt for blending,  buying power generators
for use when the public service fails.
For the theoretical  framework  and econometric  analysis  in this study, we concentrate  on
the power sector and on firms' behavior. The general analytical  and policy implications  are,
however, also relevant to other infrastructure  sectors and, with more extensive adaptation,  to
household  behavior.
The extent of internal generation  of power varies among firms and is related to their
production  technologies.  Two most important  reasons  for producing  electricity  endogenously  are
the uncertainty  about power outages and the fluctuations  in the voltage of public power which
can cause damages  to plant, equipment,  intermediate  inputs  and output  in the assembly  line. To
minimize this problem, if not solve it completely,  blender firms produce their own power to
either substitute  or supplement  the public  supply. The endogenously  generated  power is used to
"boost" the power supply  obtained  from the public sector smoothing  out voltage fluctuations  in
the public supply  or it is used to supply  the plant when the public  power source is interrupted.
When firms combine  publicly  provided  and privately  produced  power to meet their own
needs, a number of interesting  policy questions  arise about the optimal behavior of the public
sector. When public sector deficiencies  cannot be eliminated  in even the medium term due to
financial, cultural and technical  constraints (as is the case in numerous LDC's), what are the
infrastructure  policy instruments  that can be used to enhance  the productivity  of businesses  and
manufacturers  ?  Clearly, it may be optimal  for the public sector to encourage some degree of
endogenous  infrastructure  in the private sector, since  an expanded  capacity  or more intensive  use3
of existing  idle capacity  in the private sector  reduces  the demands  placed  on the limited  capacity
in the public sector. Reduced demands  on the public sector, in turn, mean that congestion is
reduced and that the quality and efficiency of  the public sector infrastructure service is
improved.
At a more practical  level, when  public  power  cannot  be efficiently  provided, how should
the public sector encourage  private  production  of power?  What is the optimal  allocation  of public
power among  the various  users who  differ according  to their  ability to generate  power  privately?
Who should receive  priority in the allocation  of electricity, large users, or small?
The correct answers  to these questions  must take into account  a number  of observations.
First, publicly provided power is limited  in both quantity  and quality. Second, different users
will differ in what they are willing  to pay for public  power  at the margin. Large firms, having
installed  large generating  capacities  of their own, will have little to gain from improvements  in
the public power supply  at the margin. Smaller  firms will find it too expensive  to produce their
own power (because of the high fixed costs) and will be willing to pay considerably for
additional public sector power and for public supply improvements. An appropriate policy
response would be to reallocate  the use of public power from the larger users to the smaller
ones. Since  pricing is the most efficient  means  for reallocating  a limited  resource and since users
decide on quantity purchased by considering  the price they are charged at the margin, it is
questionable  whether power suppliers  in developing  countries  should  continue to offer quantity
discounts.  Such discounts  favor larger users and discriminate  against smaller users. To allocate
the limited power supply  more efficiently,  it may  be optimal  to impose  increasing  block tariffs.
The conflicting costs and benefits from such a revised pricing policy are as follows.4
There is a direct benefit as larger users are induced to buy less public power and to utilize
private power generators at costs only somewhat  higher than the public sector's.  While this
increases  the power use and costs of large users, such increases  in costs can be more than offset
by the savings realized by the smaller users. Since these smaller users are  offered lower
marginal prices, they increase their use of public power, reduce their costly reliance on their
own generators and become  more productive.  There is also an indirect benefit which depends
on whether the total power purchased  from the public  sector decreases. If so, given the fixed
public transmission  capacity,  the reduced  load relieves  the level of congestion  and improves  the
quality of the power delivered  to firms.
The  tnain  focus of  this paper  is  to  provide quantitative support for  the  above
observations,  using  data from Nigeria  and Indonesia.  For Nigeria, we rely upon a survey  of 179
Nigerian  manufacturers  conducted  in 1988. 89.4%, or 160, of the firms sampled  were blenders
of public and privately generated  power. In aggregate,  these firms supplied  32% of their power
needs from their own generators, with this percentage  varying  among the firms from  a mere
0. 14% to a high of 96%. We also observed  that these firms had installed  a great deal of power
generating  capacity but did not utilize  it fully. On the average  25  % of the installed capacity  was
reported as utilized, the rest being kept in reserve for extreme  power outages  or as "insurance"
against further deteriorations  in public power. For our econometric  work, we use 131 blending
firms that bought and used non-negligible  amounts of electricity and for which we had clean
data.
For Indonesia,  we rely upon a survey  of 290 Indonesian  manufacturers.  59% of the firms
sampled were blenders of public  and private  power. In aggregate,  these firms supplied 47% of5
their power needs from their own generators,  from a mere 0.1 % to a high of 99.9%. Of these
171  firms that blended  public  and private  electricity,  30 firms  generated  1000  kilowatt  hours per
year or less, too little to be much more than "warming  up" their generators from time to time.
Our empirical analysis is restricted to  118 firms that produced and bought non-negligible
amounts of electricity  and for which  we had clean data.
We supplement the econometric  analyses of  Nigeria and Indonesia with data from
Thailand,  a country where hardly any firms produce  their own electricity. We rely on a survey
of 300 Thai manufacturing  firms, only 18 of whom had their own electricity generators; we
estimate scale and price elasticities for the 250 Thai firms that did not produce their own
electricity  and for which we had clean data.
Nigeria, Indonesia, and Thailand offer a spread of power infrastructure climates. In
Nigeria, the govemment has enforced a  strict govemment power monopoly despite severe
inadequacies  in the quality of the public supply of electricity, forbidding  sales of electricity
across firms and  making costly firms'  investments in  their  own generating capacity. In
Indonesia, govemment has a monopoly  on power transmission,  but the inadequacies in the
quality of public provision are less severe than in Nigeria. Moreover, Indonesian firms have
recently been allowed to sell electricity  to one another, and the cost of generators to firms have
been reduced of late by reductions in import duties and tariffs. In Thailand, the govemment
monopoly on electricity sales has not led to  such poor quality that firms seek to produce
electricity for themselves.
Nigeria,  Indonesia, and  Thailand also  offer contrasting economic climates.  The
longstanding economic boom in  Thailand, more recent boom times in  Indonesia, and the6
persistent stagnation of the Nigerian economy each presents policy makers with a different
environment in  which to  make public infrastructure decisions. Consequently, even though
Nigeria and Indonesia share some common infrastructure  problems, the appropriate policy
responses  differ between them.
The empirical approach  we take for Nigeria and Indonesia  is to model the production
process of firms by means of country-specific  translog cost functions in which the inputs of
electricity are  a mix of endogenously  determined quantities of own power, and quantities
purchased from the public  sector. We estimate  such models  using our small samples  of 160  and
141 blending  firms which differed widely  in their scale of operations,  in their industries  and in
their locations  within Nigeria  and Indonesia.  We then use the estimated  model to calculate the
shadow prices of purchased  electricity. We found that in both Nigeria and Indonesia smaller
firms  would be willing  to pay much  for additional  publicly  provided  electricity  than  would  larger
firms. These findings,  suggest  the Nigerian  Electric  Power Authority  (NEPA)  and its Indonesian
counterpart, PLN, might improve efficiency  by "tilting" the tariff against firms that purchase
larger quantities  of electricity  (i.e. offering  increasing  blocks tariffs), thus inducing  them to use
their idle capacities  and reducing  congestion.  (Firms that purchase  more electricity  tend also to
be larger firms overall.) In fact, we believe increasing block price electricity tariffs would
improve economic efficiency in Nigeria. But we are slow to recommend  a similar policy in
Indonesia  because it is likely  that the Indonesian  economy's longer term response  to the current
economic  boom is likely to overcome  the infrastructure  deficiencies  reported by our sample of
firms. This contrasts with the case of Nigeria, where chronic infrastructure deficiencies have
long been, and are likely to remain, the rule.7
In most studies of the firm in developed  countries  where public infrastructure systems
are not the constraining  factors, the production  and cost functions  are usually specified  without
variable inputs such as power and water, unless the purpose of the study is to measure the
substitution  elasticities  between these infrastructure  inputs and other inputs. Such studies are
those by Berndt  and Wood  (1975), Griffen  and Gregory  (1976), Christensen  and Greene  (1976)
and Pindyck (1979).
In the productivity  literature  [see Berndt  and Christensen  (1973), Denny  and Fuss (1977)
and Stevenson  (1980)], cost functions  are widely  preferred  over production  functions  because
cost functions  are easy to estimate,  even  when variable  returns to scale are assumed. Hence, in
section II we begin by developing  a general theoretical  model of the firm's cost minimization
problem with the two types of electricity  entering as separate inputs with private electricity
production  embedded  in primary production. This model  shows  how the firm chooses to blend
the two types of electricity  given that each is nonlinearly  priced:  the endogenously  generated
electricity is subject to scale economies  and, hence, has declining marginal cost while that
purchased from public providers is subject  to a quantity  discount.
In section III we discuss, in general terms, translog econometric  specifications  of our
theoretical models. In section  IV, we present estimates  for Nigeria  and Indonesia  in which the
embedded cost function for electricity and the primary cost function are both specified in
translog form. In both countries, the primary cost function is conditioned  on both purchased
(public sector) electricity and on  the  firm's  capital stock; hence the  cost  functions are
"restricted" cost functions. The embedded  cost functions estimated differ between the two
countries. Electricity  generators  are taken as fixed in Nigeria, where there is widespread  excess8
capacity,  and as variable in Indonesia  where firms are generally  expanding  and generators are
widely  marketed. The estimated  cost functions  confirm  the presence  of strong scale economies
in embedded  production.  A translog  primary cost function for Thailand is also reported. As in
Nigeria and Indonesia,  capital is held fLxed,  but in Thailand,  purchased  electricity is a variable
input and there is no embedded  electricity  production in the model.
Analyses  of the shadow  prices of purchased  electricity  are also presented in section IV.
Because  of strong quantity  discounts  in NEPA's tariff, small firms pay much larger marginal
prices for public electricity  than do large firms. We estimate that small firms have markedly
higher shadow  prices for electricity  than do large firms. If NEPA and PLN were to charge the
largest  firms more and the smaller firms less  than they  currently  charge, more electricity would
become  available  to those who  are willing  to pay the most for it. This is the opposite  of current
practice in which the  NEPA and PLN set declining block price tariffs. The optimality of
increasing  block tariffs for both Nigeria and Indonesia  was confirmed  in simulations  reported
in Anas and Lee (1995). However, the economic  benefits  of switching  from the current tariffs
to the optimal  ones varied  considerably  between  the two countries. On the one hand, in Nigeria,
the total cost of production  among  the sampled  manufacturers  plus the cost of publicly  provided
electricity  decreased from 4% to 9%, depending  on the assumptions  of the simulation.  On the
other hand, in Indonesia,  the comparable  decreases  in cost were from 0.01 % to 0.06%, which
are negligible.
In Nigeria, a more efficient strategy of higher prices for purchasers of more electricity
would induce NEPA's largest customers  to make more intensive use of their idle generating
capacities. In Indonesia, such a policy would spur larger users, who are more efficient power9
producers, to expand their generating  facilities  and smaller users, who are less efficient power
producers, to contract  theirs. In both countries,  as large users switched  to their own generators,
congestion  on the transmission  network  would be reduced and the quality of the public power
delivered to the smaller users would improve.  Small users would, in turn, realize savings by
having to rely less on expensive  endogenous  production  of electricity. However, in Indonesia,
where rapid economic  growth  is already spurring government  to markedly improve its public
infrastructure  provision, incentives  to expand  own-generating  capacity, only mildly helpful in
the short run, might prove quite inefficient  in the long run. We therefore conclude that only
NEPA in Nigeria  should  adapt an increasing  block  price tariff for publicly  provided  electricity.
We further encourage  Nigeria to facilitate  inter-firm  sales of electricity,  as Indonesia  is
doing. The marked  economies  of scale  in production  of own  electricity  suggest  that  smaller firms
would do better to buy power from larger neighbors  rather than invest in their own generating
capacity. Section V concludes  with a discussion  of these policy recommendations.
II.  THEORETICAL MODEL
As  explained  above, nearly  90% of the sampled  manufacturing  firms  in Nigeria, and 59%
of the sampled firms in Indonesia,  were observed to consistently  use both publicly supplied
power and electricity they generated  internally.  The reasons why firms use the two sources of
power differ widely among firms and are technological  in nature. In some industries, critical
functions  require uninterrupted  operation  of the assembly  line. Hence,  internally  generated  power
must be used immediately  upon  a failure  in the public supply  or else prohibitive  damage  results.
In other industries, temporary  shutdowns  may be tolerable  from a technological  point of view
(there is no damage to equipment)  but are considered too uneconomical  as  most factors of10
production remain idle but are paid. In other cases, firms may decide to use their own power
simply  to moderate  voltage fluctuations  and improve the quality of their output.
In this analysis, we treat the inadequacies  of NEPA's and PLN's electricity  provision as
an element of the underlying technology  available to firms. Power interruptions and voltage
surges force firms to use more of other inputs for any given output and quantity of NEPA or
PLN electricity  than would  be the case if these public  suppliers  were technically  efficient. In an
effort to minimize  the cost consequences  of NEPA's or PLN's inefficiency, almost all firms
supplement  public electricity with their internally  generated  electricity. To explain the firms'
own generating activity, we analyze Nigerian  and Indonesian  manufacturing  technology in a
model that includes  an embedded  production  process for own electricity  generation, as well as
the consumption  of electricity  purchased  from -the  public monopoly.  Since our concern is
with the private provision of infrastructure,  we restrict our econometric model to only those
firms using  both sources  of power. (This  restriction  justifies  our econometric  specification  which
assumes each type of power is an essential  input.)
The notation  of our theoretical  model, to be explained  below, is briefly summarized  as
follows:
Q  : quantity  of output produced  by the firms's primary production  process,
e  : quantity  of electricity  produced  internally  (embedded  production)  and used as
an input in primary production,
eD  : quantity  of electricity  bought from the public sector (NEPA or PLN) and
used as an input in primary production,
XO  : column vector  of n input quantities  such as labor, materials, capital (but not11
electricity) used in primary production,
X,  : column vector of m input quantities  (such as labor, materials  and generators)
used in endogenous  (embedded)  electricity  production,
P  :price  of the firm's primary output,
p  : column  vector of primary input prices,
w  :column vector of embedded  input prices,
t(e 5)  :the  tariff cost for eB  units of publicly  supplied  electricity.
NEPA and PLN both give quantity  discounts.  Hence,
at(eB)/aeB  >  0 and a2t(eB)/aeB 2 <  0.
The firm's production function  for the primary output is specified  with two electricity
variables:
(1)  Q =  Q(XO,e,eB),
The production  of own electricity,  e, is specified  by the embedded  production  function:
(2)  e  =  e(Xe)
We  assume that the  firm is  competitive in  both input and output markets. Such a
competitive  firm maximizes  profit, x, as follows:
(3)  maximize Tr =  PQ(X.,e(X, ),eB) - p'X-  W'Xk  - t(eB)
Xo,Xe,eB
Equivalently, the above can also be written as
(3')  maximize  r =  PQ(X.,e,eB) - p'X0 - c(w, e) -t(eB)
XO,e,eB
where c(w,e) =  w'X,  is the cost function for embedded  electricity production and gives the
minimum  cost of producing  e units of electricity  internally  when the embedded  input prices are12
w. In other words, X,  solves  the following  cost minimization  problem
Minimize w'X,, subject to:  e(X.)=e.
Given our data, it is easier to do empirical  work with cost functions  than with production
functions.  We choose, therefore, to  treat firms as cost minimizers. The appropriate cost
minimization  problem is:
(4)  Minimize  p'X.  +  w'X, +  t(e5)
Xo,xC,eB
subject to: Q =  Q(X 0,e(X, ),eB).
Or, using the cost function for embedded  electricity,  we can also write this as
(4')  Minimize p'X. + c(w,e) +  t(eB)
X0,e,eB
subject to: Q =  Q(X.,e,e 8).
It is easy to show that (4) and (4') are equivalent.  On the one hand, because c(w,e) is the
minimum cost of producing e  units of power, ae/aX.,  =  w 1/A, for each embedded input
i=l,...,m.  jA  is the marginal cost of the embedded  output, e. On the other hand, from (4),
ae/laX, =  w; /[(aQ/ae)X], where X is the marginal  cost of Q. Hence, for (4) and (4') to be
equivalent, we need that ju =  (dQ/de)X.  But this is clearly true, since the  left side is the
marginal  cost of embedded  power  and the right side is the marginal  product of embedded  power
times the marginal cost of the output.
We prefer to work with (4') since it is simpler. The Lagrangian  function of (4') is
(5a)  L  =  p'X.  +  c(w,e)  +  t(eB) +X[Q - Q(X.,e,eB)]
Maximizing  (5a) with respect  to X,, e, eB  and X we obtain  the first order conditions,  which are:
(5b)  aL/aXi  =  pi - M(aQ/lXj),13
(5c)  dLIae  =  ac(w,e)/ae  - X(8Q/ae),
(5d)  aL/aeb  = at(e,)/aeB- X(aQ/aes),
(5e)  dL/AX  = Q - Q(X,e,%e).
The Lagrangian multiplier  X is the shadow  price of the output. When X = P, the market
price of the output, then (5b)-(5d)  satisfy  the condition  of profit maximization  that the value of
the marginal product  of each input equals its marginal  cost.
Rates of technological  substitution  (RTS)  between  any pair of inputs  are obtained  from (5b)
through (5d). They are
(6a)  RTS(Xo,,Xj) = (aQ/aXoJ/(aQ/8Xoj)  = pi/pj, for any two primary inputs i and j,
(6b)  RTS(X 02,e)  = (aQ/IaXj)/(Q/aX.)  = pi/[ac/ae], for any primary input i,
(6c)  RTS(eB,e)  =  (aQ/ae.)/(8Q/re)  =  [at/aeB]/[ac/ae].
(6d)  RTS(Xoi,XCj)  =  (aQ/aX..)f[(aQ/ae)  (ae/aX,)]  =  p1/wj, for any primary input i, and
any embedded  input j
Labor appears in both the primary and embedded  production  functions. However, since
the skills required in the two settings  may differ, the wage rates may differ between the two.
Consequently,  we treat labo, in the two settings  as distinct  inputs.
It  should be noted that NEPA and PLN quantity discounts and scale economies in
embedded  production  (falling  marginal  costs of e and eB)  mean that the cost of power is concave
in e  and eB which causes the isocost curve between e and eB (keeping X. constant) to be
nonlinear and convex to the origin. However, as long as the isoquants  are convex to the origin
and do not cut the axes (because  of our assumption  that both e and C 9 are essential inputs), the
tangency between the isocost curve and the isoquant insures an interior solution. The TRS14
conditions (6c) implies the Marshallian  equilibrium  condition  that the marginal products of the
last naira or rupiah spent  on each type of electricity  are equal. Of course, the same is true for
any pair of inputs and the optimal mix is determined  by satisfying  all of these conditions,(6a)-
(6d), simultaneously.
The duality of production  and cost implies that one can examine  firms' technologies  by
estimating  either their  production  functions  or their  cost functions.  Since  we have chosen  to work
with cost functions,  examining  returns  to scale  is particularly  straightforward.  However, the non-
linearity of electricity  input prices does pose a problem in cost or profit function estimation.
Maximizing  5a does not yield a traditional  profit function  because the electricity  inputs
do not have constant marginal  (equal  to average)  prices. One cannot express  costs as a function
of a set of (constant  marginal,  equal to average)  input  prices and output. Similarly, there is not
a traditional  cost function corresponding  to cost minimization  for a given level of output as a
function of  input prices. However, for purposes of  estimating the  characteristics of  the
production technology  and cost structure, one can instead use what Murray (1983) called a
"mythical  cost function" for the firm. We use this device in our estimation. In the mythical
function, the firm's costs are recalculated  as if marginal  costs were the constant  average cost for
the firm. Murray shows that such a reformulation  of the model does identify the underlying
technology  of the firm with behavioral  data from cost minimizing  firms facing non-linear  input
prices. The essence of the procedure can be seen by looking at (6b) and (6c): once the two
marginal  prices are evaluated  at the observed  electricity  levels  for the firm, those  marginal  prices
enter the first order conditions  just as constant (marginal-equal-to-average)  prices would in a
standard cost function.15
A more specific model can now be developed  by defining the firm's technology and
setting an appropriate time horizon. Usually,  economists  think of the firm as having two time
horizons, long run and short run. In the long run all primary inputs, capital, labor and raw
materials  would  be variable, together  with each type  of electricity.  In the short run, some inputs
would be fixed. For our purposes, it is useful to think of two different  short run cases; one in
which  all capital, including  generators  is fixed, and another  in which  primary production  capital
is fixed while generator  capital  is variable. Nigeria  better fits the former sort of short run. Most
Nigerian  firms have  considerable  excess  capacity,  and operate  with quantities  of primary capital
and generating  capital  that  were chosen  long ago. Indonesia  better fits the latter sort of short run.
Primary capital is not varied often, so the Indonesian  firms we observe, few of which are new
firms, did not settle upon their primary capital  requirements  recently;  but generators are more
easily added  than some  other capital  equipment,  like structures,  and there appears to be an active
market for generator sales to new and old firms alike.
We first specify  the firms' embedded  cost function  in the  fixed generators case, which
we will apply to the Nigerian  data. The embedded  cost function  takes the form:
(7)  c(w,e;k) = c (w,,w,,,e;k),
where w, and wm  are the embedded  input prices of labor and material, and k is the stock of
generators. Variable  embedded  cost in this instance  is labor costs plus materials  costs. Because
of  expected scale economies in  embedded production we expect ac(w,e)/ae  <  c(w,e)/e
(marginal  cost is below  average  cost). The firm  values  embedded  power at its marginal  cost. Let
Pe denote the price of embedded  power, it is calculated  from (7) as follows:
(8)  Pe =  MC.  =  ac(w1,w.,e;k)/ae16
When generators are treated  as a variable  input (as we shall treat them in the Indonesian  case),
Wk  being the price of capital, the price of embedded  power, pC,  then becomes:
(9)  p. = MCC  = ac(wI,w. 1 ,wk,e)/ae
The variable  cost of embedded  production  in this case consists of labor cost, generator
costs, and material  cost. Again,  we expect  scale  economies  in embedded  production.  As we shall
see below, the variable cost of primary production consists of the costs of labor and raw
materials in primary production plus payments to NEPA or PLN and the cost of producing
embedded  electricity.
As was discussed above, electricity sold by either NEPA or PLN is also priced non-
linearly due to quantity  discounts  in the tariffs with the marginal  tariff price below the average
tariff. Hence, letting pB be the marginal cost of buying power from NEPA or PLN, it is
calculated  as:
(10)  pB = MCG  =  8t(eB)/aeB
The system of equations  defining the firms's short run variable cost structure  can now
be written as  follows in  the case when generators are  a  fixed capital input in embedded
production and primary capital, K, is a fixed input in primary production.
(11)  C(p,Q;K)  =  C(PL,PM,Pe,,pB,Q;K)
c(w,e;k)  = c(w,,w.,e;k)
Pe  =  ac(w,e)/ae
PBa  = at(e,)/ae 9
Since neither pe nor PB  are constants, (11) is not, strictly spealing, a traditional cost
function. However, if the costs of electricity  inputs are calculated  as if the operative marginal17
prices were constant average prices, so that the costs are not observed costs, but "mythical"
costs, as defined in Murray(1983),  then (1H)  can be used as if it were a true cost function, the
cost function that would apply if average  (equal  to marginal)  prices were indeed constant. Such
a mythical  cost function  suffices  for calculating  scale economies,  shadow  prices and input price
elasticities.18
III. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
(i) Translog Specification  of Cost Functions
Since the firms in our sample belong to different industries, their technologies differ
widely. The  translog cost function [Christensen,  Jorgenson and Lau (1971)] is one of the
flexible functional  forms which allows a variable elasticity  of substitution  and variable returns
to scale and therefore we chose the translog specification  for our econometric  function.
First, we specify  the embedded  cost functions,  one with generators fixed and all other
embedded  production  inputs  variable  (for Nigeria),  and the other with all embedded  production
inputs variable (for Indonesia).  Both are specified  in translog  form.
When generators are fixed:
(12)  In c(w,e;k) = cx  +  Ei OB  In w; +  'h EjEj  Oij  In w; In w; +  t3In  e
+  I/2  Be (In e)2 +  ri Bij In wj In e  +  t
3ke  In k In e
+  Ej  kj  ln k In w, +  Ok  In k +  1/2 okk  (Ink)2 +  fc.
When generators are variable, the price vector, w,  includes the  marginal price of
generating  capital (k) and the terms which include k are dropped  from (12).
For the efficient estimation  of the translog  cost function,  Bemdt and Christensen  (1973)
suggested a  system of seemingly  unrelated  regressions (SUR of Zellner (1962)) of the cost
function  along with its share equations. Differentiating  (12), (i.e., applying  Shephard's  Lemma)
yields the share equations  for the fixed generators  case:
(13)  Si  =  aln c(w,e;k)/dln w;  = w; xi /c(w,e)
=  ,i  +  Ej  i,,  In w, +  Bik In k +  P,  In e +  Ej
where w 1,wj  =  prices of labor and materials;19
e  = firm's own production  of electricity;
e,, ci  = error terms in the cost and share equations;
EQS,  =  1, and  Bj;  = ,Bji  for all i,j (the symmetry  condition).
In the variable generators  case, the In k term drops from (13) and an additional  share equation,
that for generators  appears.
The cost function is homogenous  of degree one in prices, it will therefore require the
following  restrictions  on the coefficients:
i fi  =  I ;  i jj  Ej  =  ej  iic  =  0.
Since the shares add to unity, only two share equations  are independent  when generators are
variable, and only one when generators  are fixed, so there are as many equations  as there are
variable factors.  In the variable generators  case there are 27 parameters, but 12 restrictions
leave only  15 free parameters to be estimated from a system of three equations, i.e.,  the
embedded  cost function  and the share  equations  for labor and materials.  We estimate the system
of equations  using maximum  likelihood.
The marginal  cost of e can be calculated  by differentiating  the embedded  cost function:
(14a)  aln c(w,e;k)/dln e = 0, + ,B  In k +  In e + Lii ,  In wi
in the fixed generators case, or
(14b)  aln c(w,e)/aln e =  /  + 0,  In e + E,  I  in w;
in the variable generators case.
Hence, in the fixed generators  case:
(15)  p. = MCC  =  [c(w,e;k)/e]  [aln c(w,e;k)/dln  e]
= [c(w,e;k)/e] [Oe  + 0,  In k +  0,C In e + Ei O,B  In w; ]20
or, in the variable generators  case:
(15)  pe =  MCe =  [c(w,e)/e3  aln c(w,e)/aln  e]
=  [c(w,e)/e] [Le + 0,.  In e +  Ei ,  I  in w;].
The marginal costs so estimated  will be used, in turn, in the estimation  of the primary variable
cost function. The primary variable  cost is:
(16)  C(p,Q;K)  = pL  L+  PM  M +  c(w,e)  +  t(eB).
with c(w,e;k) replacing  c(w,e) in the case of fixed  generators.
This primary cost function  is specified  in its translog form as follows:
(17)  In C(p,Q;K)  =  a  +  Ei ,B In pi +  VEjEj ,ij ln  pi pj +  ,BQ  lnQ
+  'h,SQQ (In Q)2 +  Li  ,iQ In pi In Q  +  BK  Q In K In.Q
+  OK In K +  /2hK  K (In K) 2 +  Li ,iK In pi In K +  uc.
Here,
pi, pi =  prices of labor, price of  materials  and the appropriate  marginal  costs of e and
eB.
Q =  firm's primary output, and
K  fixed primary capital  excluding  generators.
Differentiating  with respect  to prices, we get the share equations  for the variable factors in the
primary cost function:
(18)  Si = aln C(p,K,Q)/dln pi  = pi Xi /C(p,K,Q)
=  ,Bi  +  1 /2j  ,B  j In p, + Li  ,B  Q  In Q +  ,jK In K  +  ui,
where, E*S,  =  1; 05jj  =  j i for all i,j; and uc ,ui are the error terms in the cost and share
equations.21
As before, homogeneity  of degree zero in prices will require the following  restrictions on the
coefficients  of the primary cost function:
(19)  LjA  =  1;  Li Oi  j  =""  Ej AX  j  =_  -i gi Q =i  ,  Ri K  °-: 
There are 48 parameters but the 21 restrictions will leave only 27  free parameters to be
estimated from a system of four equations. Berndt and Wood (1975) have also shown that
parameter estimates  are invariant  with the choice  of the share equations. Thus, any three share
equations  can be chosen to form a system  of four equations  along with the cost equation. Since
the errors uc and ui are assumed  to be uncorrelated  and all right hand side variables  are identical,
the SUR technique can be applied to  the system of  4 equations with 21  restrictions on
parameters, and 7 restriction  across coefficients  to ensure homogeneity  in prices.
Below  we discuss  the calculation  of scale economies,  own, cross price  and substitution
elasticities  and shadow  prices from the.  translog  cost function.
(ii) Scale Economies
Since the translog cost function is non-homothetic  and non-homogeneous  in output,
implying  a non-linear  expansion  path, scale economies  are calculated  by the inverse  of the cost
elasticity  of output:
(20)  77CQ  =  aln C/aln Q =  ,Q  +  ,BQQ  ln Q +  Ei  8fQ  In pi +  3 QK  In K.
7?CQ  >  1 implies diminishing returns to scale, %CQ  <  1 implies increasing returns to scale, and
71CQ  =  1 implies constant returns to scale.  The reciprocal of 77CQ is defined as the degree of scale
economies, SCE = 
1/71CQ.  Scale economies  are determined  by input prices, by the scale of the
output (In Q), and by plant capital (In K). Notice that this measure of  scale economies in
primary production does not reflect cost savings arising from scale economies in embedded22
production or from declining block tariffs. Alternative  scale measures incorporating the cost
savings stemming from such scale economies  or from declining  block price tariffs could be
constructed.
Following  Stevenson  (1980), the bias (effect) of the ith input on the economies  of scale
is:
(21)  a71cQ  laln pi =  ,i Q
A positive (negative)  sign implies  that a specific  input i is cost adding (saving.). We are
particularly  interested  in the effect  of electricity  prices on scale economies. The coefficient  OiQ,
with i indicating electricity, will determine  whether the increase in the price of electricity is
scale-augmenting  or scale-offsetting.
(iii) Own. Cross-Price. and Substitution  Elasticities
The coefficients  of the cross product  terms Bij  determine  the Allen partial elasticities  of
substitution  among inputs.
(22)  o,  =  (B,,  +  S,2 - Si )/S,2,
o=  (Bij +  gS  gj )/-Si Sj
a,j represents the elasticity of substitution  calculated  at the estimated shares (Si). A positive
(negative) sign implies substitutability  (complementarity). aii is used to determine the own
elasticities of input demand:
(23)  i^ , =  u,, S
7ij  =aj  gjS
71 j  =  i  Sj.
7u  is the own price elasticity  of demand  while 7lj  represents  the cross price elasticity  of demand.23
In the present  study, the own and cross price elasticities of demand for energy  would be of
special interest for policy.  The technological importance of electricity can be judged by the own
price elasticity of demand, the elasticities of substitution between the two electricities and the
elasticities between electricity and other inputs.
For judging the implications of cross subsidization or changes in tariff structures, the own
and cross price elasticities of demand for electricity, i7e and 7e,i are of relevance. Since the share
of inputs Si and S, are different for different firms, the elasticities of substitution and the demand
elasticities for inputs can be calculated for individual firms.
(iv) Shadow Prices of Electricity Inputs
Shadow prices represent a firm's  marginal willingness to pay for the use of inputs.  We
know from economic theory that a competitive firm, in equilibrium, pays each input its value
of  marginal product.  Following Bemdt, Fuss and Waverman (1973), the shadow price of an
input can be calculated by estimating a "restricted" cost function holding the quantity of the input
as quasi-fixed. The derivative of the restricted cost function with respect to the quasi-fixed input
is the value of its marginal product to the firm. Should a firm increase the quasi-fixed input by
one unit, holding the output and other input prices constant, the firm would have to adjust its
other inputs,  to keep its output constant. The firm's  variable cost of the other inputs  would
decrease  by the value of the input's  marginal product. The negative of this value of marginal
product is commonly known as the "shadow price"  of the quasi-fixed input. In our case,  the
shadow price  of  purchased electricity,  eB, can be  calculated by estimating  a  restricted  cost
function of the form
(24)  C(p,  Q; K,  eB)  =  C[PL, PM,  P,.  Q; K, eB]24
where C is here defined as the variable cost of production excluding the cost of purchased
electricity. Electricity  purchased, eB  is fixed for each firm, but variable across the firms. If the
actual price of purchased  electricity  were equal to its shadow  price, SPCB,  at the fixed level of
e,  the firm (if left unrestricted) would choose to purchase just  that restricted quantity of
electricity (see Murray, 1988).
The shadow  price of publicly  supplied  electricity  (from  24) would be:
(25)  SPB = - aC/aeB  -
The translog specification of the restricted cost function (24) is:
(26)  In C(p,Q;K,eR) =  ca  +  Ei Bij  In pi +  VAiEij  fij In pi pj +  1 3Q  In Q
+  1/2 3Q  Q (In Q) 2 + Ei /i Q  In pi In Q +  OK InK +  1 0K K (In K)2
+  -r ,B  i  In pi In K+  iB In  en  +  A/20BB  (Ines) 2 +  gj  DB  In pi In ei
+•  KQ  In Q In K +  IBQ  l  n e +O8K  In K In eB +  uC.
Since there are three prices, PL PMm  and PC, only two share equations will be independent.
(27)  Si =  aln C(p,Q;K,eE)/aln pi =  pi Xi /C(p,Q;K,eB)
=  OI +  Fj  ,j  In p, +  ,i 3Q In Q  +  OiK  In K +  i EB  In eB  +  ui
Where pi and p 2 are any two of the three prices.
We can determine the shadow price of eD by manipulating the derivative of (26) with
respect to In eB:
(28)  1CEBB =  a In C(p,Q;K,eB  )/ a In  e
=  B  +  B B In e  +  Ei Oi  B In pj +  OB  Q  In Q +  OD  K In K
(29)  SPB  =  - (C/eB)t 7 B  (where  i,j =  L,M,e)25
IV. ESTIMATION  RESULTS
(i) The Nigerian Sample
The project's  establishment survey included 179 firms of various sizes. It was found that
7.8% of the surveyed firms were captive to NEPA and did not produce any power on their own.
Another 2.8%  were self sufficient and used their own generated power exclusively.  89.4% of
the sampled firms (160 firms) used both, public power and internally generated power.  As an
aggregate, these firms internally generated about 32% of their power needs. The proportion of
total electricity that is internally generated varies across firms from 0.14% to 96%.  The present
study is limited to a sample of 131 firms which produce and purchase non-negligible amounts
of electricity and for which we have clean data.
ii) Indonesian Sample
The  project's  establishment survey included 290  firms of  various  sizes.  41 % of  the
surveyed firms were captive to PLN and did not produce any power on their own; none used
their own generated power exclusively. The remaining 59% of the firms (171 firms) used both
public power and  intemally generated power.  In aggregate,  these firms  internally generated
about 47% of  their power  needs; the average ratio of intemally generated electricity  to total
electricity use was 28%. The percent proportion varied across firms from 0.1%  to 99.9%.  The
present  study  is  limited to  the sample  of  118 firms  which  use both  public  and  embedded
electricity in non-negligible amounts and for which we had clean data.
(iii) The Thai Sample
The project's  establishment survey included 300 Thai manufacturing firms,  only  18 of
which had  their own generating capacity. Another 32 observations were  lost  due  to  missing26
values, leaving 250 observations  for the econometric  analysis.
(iv) Estimation  of the Nigerian  Embedded  Cost Function
To estimate the embedded  cost function with generators fixed, as we assume to be the
case in Nigeria, we need two  prices: the price of labor used in embedded  production (wage  rate)
and the price of materials.  In Nigeria, the present  value of generators  appears  as the fixed  capital
input (k) in the variable cost function,  and a price for capital  is not needed.
For the price of labor, the total wage bill in electricity production is divided by the
number  of workers employed  to run the generators.  Since we had no measurement  of either the
price or the quantity of materials,  but only of material expenditure, we needed in Nigeria a
proxy  for either quantity  or price to infer the other from expenditure.  We chose the capacity
of the firm's generators  as a proxy for the quantity  of materials  needed  to generate electricity.
We believe the errors in variables  induced  by this procedure  are small relative  to the variations
in materials  prices across  the regions from which  firms are sampled.  Thus we measure  the price
of materials for the ith firm as:
(30)  w.i  = Mi / KVA ,
where M, is expenditure  on materials.
The Nigerian  embedded  variable  cost function  with generating  capital fixed is therefore:
(31)  c(w,e;k) = c (w,,w,,,e;k).
The stock of generating capital (k) is defined by the present value of generators and
accessories  (PVG). In order to incorporate  the linear homogeneity  conditions, we normalized
the cost and all other prices by the price of labor [Berndt,  and Wood(1975)].  The set of three27
equations,  the embedded cost equation and the share equations, were estimated by maximum
likelihood. The estimates of the Nigerian embedded cost function are shown in Table  1. All the
coefficients  are  significant. The  coefficient of capital is  positive and  highly significant.  To
measure the goodness of fit, we used the coefficient of correlation between the actual dependent
variable and its predicted value. For the cost function it is 82% and for the share equation 70%.
The monotonicity condition, which requires that estimated input cost shares be positive
was satisfied for all the observations. The elasticity of substitution between labor and  material
is positive and low (a,,. =  0.450) implying  poor substitutability.
The estimated function is non-homothetic. This means that the Rate of Technical
Substitution (RTS) between any two inputs in embedded production is not independent of the
scale of output of electricity.  The cost elasticity of e,  which measures the percent  change in
variable cost with respect to one percent change in output is:
(32)  an  =  d  c(w,e;k)/8ln e  =  0.1676 +  0.0312 ln(w,  /w,)
(4.626)  (4.638)
The cost elasticity,  for the whole sample, is 0.25587. This  means that the greater  the
electricity production,  implying also larger generators, the lower the average cost of electricity
production.  From equation (32), it can be seen that a decrease in the price of materials, or an
increase in the wage, would lower the cost elasticity.
As discussed in the  earlier sections, the  electricity produced internally becomes an28
TABLE 1





In [w./wJ  0.2983
(7.725)
In k  0.4021
(7.715)
'h  [In  W,,,/WJ2  0.1045
(14.649)
In kn  [w./wj  -0.00002
(4.570)
In e  0.1676
(4.626)
In e .In [w,/wj  0.0312
(4.638)
# of Obsevations  13129
embedded (internally  produced) input in the primary production process. The marginal cost,
MCe, becomes the unit price of electricity  in primary cost estimation.  Hence,
(33)  MC 2 =  71. c(w,e)le;
showing that he marginal cost of electricity  varies with the cost elasticity  and with the average
cost of production c(w,e)/e. Since the average  cost is declining  in Nigeria (i7, <  1), there are
significant  economies  of scale in embedded  production  in Nigeria, a2c(w,e)/8e 2 <  0  and the
marginal cost of e in Nigeria is below its average  cost of production.
(v) Estimation of the Indonesian  Embedded  Cost Function
The Indonesian  data did not prove rich enough to support  estimation  of a translog cost
function for embedded  electricity.  No price terms proved  significant  in estimation.  Since the key
purpose of the embedded  cost function is to provide  estimated  marginal  cost of own generated
electricity, we chose to tackle  the problem more simply:  we regressed  variable  embedded  costs
(labor, materials, and maintenance)  against output, wage and material price, all measured in
logs. We found significant  marginal cost differences  by geocode, suggesting  that geographic
factor price differentials  not captured by our price variables may affect firms' costs. Table 2
contains the results of this regression. Notice that in all regions there is strong evidence of
increasing returns to scale in the production  of own electricity. The estimated regional cost
elasticities with respect to output were robust to the inclusion  of industry code dummies. The
scale elasticities  implicit  in Table 2 do not differ substantially  from the scale elasticities  obtained
from specifications  that included factor prices.
The cost elasticity  of own electricity  production  in each locale in Indonesia  can be read
directly from Table 2. The marginal  cost of own electricity  in each locale is estimated  by30
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In [w, 1 0.019
(0.579)
In [w 11  0.194
(1.139)
In e *(Jabotabek  0.489
site dummy)  (9.900)
In e * (Other  0.405
site dummy)  (8.902)
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applying  (33). As in Nigeria, there are considerable  economies  of scale in embedded  electricity
production  in Indonesia,  and the marginal  cost of embedded  electricity  in Indonesia  is below its
average cost of production.
(vi) Declining Block Price Tariffs for Bought  Electricity
Quantity  discounts  to large users are built into both the NEPA and PLN tariffs, t"(%)
<  0. To empirically demonstrate  this, we specified  the marginal tariffs [marginal cost] for
purchased power to follow the form:
(34)  t(eB  j, ie*)  =  B (eB  i )0  &,  0  <  ,  <  1
In Nigeria, we estimated  this to be:
(35)  In t; =  -0.9754 +  0.75633 In eBi +  In Ej  [R 2=58.7%].
(-3.30)  (15.7)
In Indonesia, we obtained:
(36)  ln tj  =  5.561  +  0.95063 In es,  +  In E,  [R2=.951.
(25.02)  (51.27)
with t-statistics  in parentheses.
From these  relationships,  we calculated  the marginal  costs of eB  in Nigeria  and Indonesia.
Obtaining
(37)  MCB =  0.75633 [t;  /eBd
and
(38)  MCB =  0.95063 [ tj IeBd,
respectively.
As explained in  the introduction, these declining block price  tariffs  are  probably32
inappropriate.  When outages and voltage fluctuations  force firms to use their own electricity,
not all firms are equally affected. Smaller  firms, with higher average  production costs for own
electricity  as estimated  above, incur  greater average  and marginal  costs than do larger firms  who
can produce their own electricity  more  cheaply. Social  costs of production  could be reduced by
reducing smaller firms'  reliance on their own electricity, even if that comes at the cost of
increasing  larger firms' reliance  on their own electricity.
Since many  outages  and voltage  fluctuations  are spurred by high levels of system usage,
reducing the large firms' demand for purchased  power through  higher electricity  prices would
increase the availability of bought electricity for small firms, and would thereby increase
economic efficiency. Below, we present evidence, wholly consistent with our unsurprising
estimates  of scale economies  in electricity  production,  that smaller firms do indeed have higher
shadow  prices for purchased  electricity.
(vii) Estimation of the Primary Cost Functions  for Nigeria and Indonesia
In this section  we present  the estimation  results for the Nigerian  and Indonesian  restricted
primary cost functions (26) and their input cost shares (27). To estimate the model, we need
three prices: the price of labor in primary production,  the price of primary intermediate  inputs,
and the marginal  cost of e (MCJ).  We also need the quantities  of primary capital and purchased
electricity (eB).
The marginal cost of own electricity  we calculate  from the already estimated  embedded
cost functions. The price of labor is calculated as the wage bill divided by the number of
workers in primary production and the price of materials is calculated as the price of the
intermediate  input on which the most is spent (which  input varies from industry to industry and33
maybe even from firm to firm, introducing an inevitable index number problem).  The capital
input, which is fixed in the short run,  includes the value of plant and equipment,  machinery
including  buildings  but  excluding  land.  The  output is  measured as  the  value  of  output  in
thousands of naira in Nigeria and in rupiah in Indonesia.
For purposes of estimation, costs in the restricted primary cost functions are computed
as if the operative marginal prices for own electricity were constant (average-equal-to-marginal)
prices.  (See the discussion of "mythical costs in Section II. The coefficient estimates for our
models are not sensitive to our decision to use as our dependent cost variable the theoretically
correct  "mythical" costs instead of the firms'  actual costs.)
From the econometric specification point of view, since MC,  an endogenous variable,
appears on both sides of the model -- on the left hand side as a component of the mythical cost
and on the right hand side as an independent price -- the simultaneity may cause correlation
among error terms. To solve this problem one must purge the right hand side MC, variable with
its estimated value to gain efficiency in estimation. In each country, we tried several exogenous
instruments to calculate the estimated values of MCe and MCH  but all lost too much information
to be useful. Since the cost share of electricity in total cost is rather small (less than 5%),  we
have decided to use the actual values of marginal costs instead of their estimated values.
The estimated restricted cost  function coefficients for both  Nigeria and  Indonesia are
shown in Table 3. Both the Nigerian and Indonesian restricted cost functions are non-homothetic.
The estimated  translog  cost function displays  positive estimated  shares,  negative own-price
elasticities and positive elasticities of costs with respect to output for 108 firms in each sample.
Because we do not estimate unrestricted primary cost functions, we cannot formally34
TABLE  3
PARAMETERS  OF THE
NIGERIAN  AND  INDONESIAN  RESTRICTED  TRANSLOG  COST FUNCTIONS
(primary  capital and  purchased electricity  taken as frixed)
Variables  Restricted Cost Function
Dep. Variable:
In (C/PI)  INDONESIA  NIGERIA
Nigeria:  1000's of
Naira  Coefficients  Coefficients
Indonesia: Rupiah  (t-ratios)  (t-ratios)
Intercept  -28.473  -1.4780
(-2.081)  (-0.804)
In (pM/pL)  0.5639  0.3424
(1.668)  (2.936)
In  (MC,/pL  0.1421  0.0196
(4.109)  (4.465)
In e,  .2.0457  -0.0049
(2.027)  (-0.019)
In Q  1.7270  0.5083
(1.947)  (1.500)
In K  0.2222  0.1900
(1.352)  (1.778)
1X [In eNl 2 0.0308  0.0628
(0.286)  (1.499)
½h [
1n(PM/p)j2  0.0528  0.0914
(7.144)  (16.837)35
'h  [In(MC,/pL)I 2 0.0007  0.0001
(0.585)  (0.313)
ln(pmIpL).1n(MCeIpL)  -0.0005  0.0002
(-0.603)  (0.692)
in(pm/pL)-In  eN  -0.0142  -0.0118
(-0.861)  (-0.772)
ln(MC./pL)- In eN  0.0004  0.0004
(0.217)  (0.801)
In Q. In (PM/PL)  0.0128  0.0488
(0.614)  (2.386)
In Q. In(MC,/pL)  -0.0061  -0.0016
(-2.831)  (-2.250)
In Q. In eN  -.1186  -0.0494
(-1.711)  (-0.840)
In K. In (PM/PL)  0.0098  -0.0358
(0.636)  (-1.938)
In K. In(MC,/pL)  0.0006  -0.0001
(0.339)  (-0.175)
Number of  118  131
Observations36
assess whether purchased  and internally  generated electricity are substitutes or complements.
However, we can  offer an  informal assessment. Virtually all  firms who choose standby
generators  choose  them sufficient  to supply  100% of the firms' electricity  needs. At any moment
in time, firms could use their own electricity as either a substitute or as a complement for
purchased  electricity  - indeed, in the field we liave observed  both kinds of behavior. However,
when one looks at annual production. as we do here, the reality of Nigerian and Indonesian
manufacturing  seems to be that the two types of electricity  are complements  - firms who need
more bought electricity also need more of their own. At root, the unreliability of  bought
electricity makes those who choose to be more dependent  on bought electricity also more
dependent  on their own electricity  production.
Own and Cross-Price  Elasticities  of Input Demand  and Elasticities  of Substitution  -
The elasticities  of substitution,  and the own and cross price elasticities  of input  demand
for Nigeria and Indonesia  are shown in Table 4; the elasticities  are estimated at the sample
means of the explanatory  variables, but the means of the firm specific elasticities  are very
similar to those reported. All estimated input demands functions  are inelastic with respect to
their own prices, and all inputs in the table are estimated  to be substitutes.  The estimated  price
elasticities  from Nigeria and Indonesia  are strikingly  similar. Labor and materials  demands  are
very unresponsive  to changes in the marginal  cost  of own  electricity, which  is unsurprising  given
the extremely small share of electricity in firm's  costs. The demand for own electricity is
markedly more responsive  to the price of materials  than to the price of labor in both countries.
Table  5 presents  some  comparison  of our estimates  of these  elasticities  with other studies.
For U.S. manufacturing,  a,  varies between  0.06 to 1.01, while Pindyck (1978) estimated  aLK37
TABLE 4
ALLEN-UZAWA  PARTIAL ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION
IN NIGERIAN AND INDONESIAN  PRIMARY PRODUCTION
(At means of estimated shares)
NIGERIA
Labor  Material  E-own
Labor  -1.421  0.536  0.846
Material  -0.216  1.034
E-own  -135.087
EiNDNESIA
Labor  Material  E-own
Labor  -1.980  0.727  0.952
Material  -0.305  1.113
E-own  -45.64338
TABLE 4 (cont'd)
OWN AND CROSS PRICE ELASTICITIES OF INPNrS
IN PRIMARY PRODUCIION
(At means of estimated shares)
NIGERIA
Elasticity of:  Labor  Material  E-own
With respect to:
Labor  -0.391  0.148  0.233
Material  0.385  -0.155  0.742
E-own  0.006  0.007  0.975
INDONESIA
Elasticity of:  Labor  Material  E-own
With respect to:
Labor  -0.535  0.197  0.257
Material  0.5  15  -0.217  0.686
E-own  0.020  0.020  -0.94339
TABLE 5
COMPARISON  OF ESTIMATES  OF FACTOR  SUBSTITUTION  ELASICITY
AND  FACTOR  DEMAND  ELASTICITY
Berndt  Gnffen &  Bendt &  Christensen  Our
& Wood  Gregory  Pindyck ;/  Mormison  & Greene h/  Study
(U.S.A.)  (U.S.A.)  (U.S.A.)  (U.S.A.)
1.01  .06  .06to.52  .63
LE  .65  .87  .721O  .87  .16  1.42/1.98
'KE  -3.22  1.07  1.02 to 1.07  .21
'ME  .75  1.03/1.11
'EE  -.045  -.79  -.78 to -.80  -.055  -.08  -.941-.98
I'LL  -.46  -.12  -.12 to -.27  -.34  -.22  -.39/-.54
'KK  -.50  -.18  -.18 to -.38  -.20  -.23
"MM  -.24  -.22  -.16/-.22
'EL  .18  .64  .42  -.23/-.26
'EK  -.18  .15  -.11
'EM  .46  .23  .741.69
ILE  .03  .11  .11  .07  .00/.02
|  1  KE  -.14  .13  .13  -.07
'ME  .01  .00/.02
a/ Nine industral countries.
b/ U.S.  electric power generation, E stands for fuels in their study.40
for nine European countries and found it to vary between 0.06 to 0.52. Results usually show labor and
electricity  as substitutes, as do our results for Nigeria. Our elasticity  of substitution  between materials  and
electricity  shows substitutability  as in Berndt  and Wood.
Cost Elasticity  with Respect to Output  and Economies  of Scale -
The estimated  cost elasticity  of output,  as a measure  of the scale effect is less than one for all firms
in both countries, implying widespread  increasing  returns to scale. Observing  positive scale economies  in
the sample suggests  capital  market  imperfections  in both countries  as low cost and high cost producers exist
side by side. The cost elasticity  is negatively  and significantly  related  to the marginal  cost of own electricity
in both countries.
The Shadow  Price of Purchased  Electricity  -
Table 6 reports the mean  and median  shadow  prices of purchased  electricity  in Nigeria  and Indonesia,
and compares  these to the mean and median tariff prices of bought  electricity  and to the mean and median
marginal  costs of own electricity. Both the shadow  prices of purchased  electricity  and the marginal cost of
own electricity  substantially  exceed the marginal  cost of purchased  electricity:  firms would much prefer to
buy their electricity than to produce it themselves.
If own electricity  and purchased  electricity  were perfect  substitutes  in production, firms should  value
additional purchased electricity  at the marginal  cost of the produced  electricity they decide to produce. In
Indonesia, the mean estimated  shadow  price of bought electricity  lies above the mean marginal cost, while
the median shadow  price lies below  the median  marginal  cost. In Nigeria, both the mean and median shadow
prices lie substantially  above the41
TABLE  6
MEAN  AND MDAN  VALUES  F'OR  SHADOW  PRICE  OF
BOUGHT  ELECTRICITY.  MARGINAL  COST OF BOUGHT  ELECTRICITY
AND  THE MARGINAL  COST OF PRODUCED  ELECTRICITY
NIGERIA
(Naira)
BOUGHT  ELECTRICITY  OWN  ELECTRICrIY
|  SHADOW  PRICE  MARGINAL  COST  MARGINAL  COST
MEAN  3.54  0.14  0.28
MEDIAN  1.00  0.06  0.11
(in the Nigerian  anal  Tysts,  generator  costs are treated  as tixed, and hence are not included  in
the marginal  cost of own electricity.)
INDONESIA
(Rupiah)
BOUGHT  ELECTRICITY  OWN  ELECTRICITY
SHADOW PRICE  MARGINAL COST  MARGINAL COST
MEAN  2437  151  1147
MEDIAN  230  128  671
In the Indonesian  analysis, generator  costs are treated  as variable, and hence are included  in
the marginal  cost of own electricity.)42
corresponding  marginal  cost statistics.  These differentials  are indicative  of the imprecision  of our estimated
cost functions.  Indeed, altering  the specification  of the primary  restricted  cost functions  modestly  (dropping
this or that insignificant  variable, for example) moves the estimated shadow prices about substantially.
However, that the shadow  prices of bought electricity  exceeds the marginal tariff price (marginal  cost) of
bought electricity is a robust finding  across specifications.
Also robust  across alternative  specifications  is the finding  that the shadow  price of bought electricity
falls with the level of bought electricity. Larger firms value bought electricity  less at the margin than do
smaller firms. Among  firms  with positive  shadow  prices for bought  electricity,  the elasticity  of shadow  price
with respect to bought electricity  is -.65 in Nigeria  and -.44 in Indonesia,  numbers that did not vary widely
across alternative specifications.  These elasticities  are not far from the elasticities  of marginal cost of own
electricity with respect to own electricity:  -.44 in Nigeria and -.60 in Indonesia.  In broad brush, what these
numbers suggest is that firms that firms' marginal  willingness  to pay for publicly  provided electricity  varies
directly with the firms' marginal cost of providing their own electricity. The shadow prices of bought
electricity shifts much like the marginal costs of own electricity  does. Thus, the shadow price evidence
reinforces the argument for a policy shift from decreasing  to increasing  block price tariffs for purchased
electricity. Firms that purchase smaller quantities  of electricity  value electricity more highly at the margin.
Redistributing  the limited supply of publicly  provided electricity  from larger purchasers to smaller would
increase  economic  efficiency  by moving  the electricity  from lower valued uses to higher valued uses.
(viii) Estimation of the Unrestricted  Primary Cost Function  for Thailand
Only 6% of Thai manufacturing  firms had their own electricity generators. Clearly, Thailand's
electricity  utility fills the needs of industry  far better than  do its Nigerian  and Indonesian  counterparts.  Thai
firms experience relatively  few power outages  and voltage  fluctuations,  sparing them the need for their own.43
generators  and permitting them to choose whatever  level of publicly  provided electricity  they desire. Since
firms can choose the level of purchased electricity, the cost function we estimate for Thai firms is an
unrestricted cost function, in contrast to the restricted cost functions estimated above for Nigeria and
Indonesia. (Strictly  speaking, the Thai cost function  is also a restricted  cost function, because we take the
capital stock as given in Thailand as  we do in Nigeria  and Indonesia.)
Since purchased  electricity  is a variable  input in Thailand,  the cost function is unrestricted  (includes
the marginal  price of purchased  electricity,  rather than the quantity).  Also, there is no own,  electricity  in the
cost function.  To estimate  the marginal  price of purchased  electricity,  we specify  that the utility's electricity
tariff is of the form (34): In Thailand,  we estimated  this to be:
(39)  In tj =  1.1145 +  0.9249 In eB  i +  ln Ej  [R2=96.1  %]
(16.719)  (83.59)
From (39) we calculate the marginal  cost of e9 in Thailand  as:
(40)  MCB =  0.9249  [tj /eB ]
Table 7 reports the estimated  coefficients  of the unrestricted  translog  cost function for Thailand. We
cannot reject the hypothesis  that technology  is homothetic  in labor, materials  and electricity, conditional  on
the level of capital. Estimated  scale economies  in Thailand  appear
constant across firms  at a level of 1.2 (cost  elasticity = .83). This level of scale elasticities  is much less than
in Nigeria or Thailand, presumably  reflecting  fewer  capital market imperfections  in Thailand than in those
other countries.
Table 8 reports the elasticities  of substitution  and the price elasticities  of factor demands  in Thailand.
It is notable that in the absence of restrictions  on purchased  electricity, eight of nine estimated elasticities
are larger in Thailand than in nearby Indonesia.44
TABLE  7
PARAMETRS OF THAI TRANSLOG  PRIMARY  COST FUNCTION
(Primary Capital Fixed)
Dependent  Variable  Coefficients
[CIpjm Bahl  1-ratios
Intercept  -11.538
(-17.318)
in (PM/PI)  -.0414
(-0.415)
in (MCM/PI)  0.3237
(-3.709)
In Q  0.8311
(16.299)
j  inK  0.1616
(2.964)
|  4  'hn(pm/pL)]1  0.0129
(2.728)




In Q.  Iln(p,/PL)  -0.0010
(-.0114)
In Q. In(MCN/pL)  0.0007
(0.159)
.In K. Iln(pM/PL)  0.0082
(0.808)
In K. In(MC,/pL)  0.0098
(2.274)
Number  of Observations  25046
TABLE 8
ALLEN-UZAWA PARTIAL ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTMTUTION
IN THAI PRIMARY PRODUCTION
(At means of estimated shares)
THAILAND
Labor  Material  E-bought
Labor  -2.052  0.954  2.331
Material  0.665  .906
E-bought  -20.546
OWN AND CROSS PRICE ELASTICITIES OF INPUTS
IN PRIMARY PRODUCTION
(At means of estimated shares)
THAILAND
Elastidty  of:  Labor  Material  E-bought
With respect  to:
Labor  -0.713  0.332  0.810
Material  0.561  -0.391  0.532
E-bought  0.152  0.059  -1.34247
V. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude  with five major policy insights  gleaned from our empirical analysis:
i) NEPA'S Tariff schedule  should  be revised to increase  economic  efficiency.
The shadow  price of eB  is higher than its tariff because  public supply is worth much more than what
firms actually pay for these services. If the firms could purchase more electricity and produce less, they
would. However, the shadow  prices of eB  vary sharply by firm size; smaller firms are willing to pay more
than large firms. Hence redistributing  public electricity supply from large firms to small firms  would
improve  economic  efficiency.  To redistribute  public  supply  in this way  would  require markedly  raising  tariffs
for large users, shifting  from the current scheme  of decreasing  block prices to increasing  block prices.
Sufficiently  large tariff increases  for large firms would lead them to reduce their use of publicly supplied
electricity, thereby reducing the congestion which is a major source of voltage fluctuations  and service
interruptions.  Thus, raising tariffs of large firms could both redistribute  electricity  efficiently  and improve
the quality of electricity service to remaining  users. (Our argument for increasing  block price schedules
differs from those  of Scholtes  (1990)  and Markandya  and Pemberton  (1990)  who show that equity  concerns
may make preferable increasing  block price schedules  for electricity in poorer countries.) The simulations
reported in Anas  and Lee (1995)  show that  the potential  gains from an increasing  block  price tariff in Nigeria
are large, while  their simulations  for Indonesia  show  only small  gains  to be had there. Consequently,  we only
recommend tariff changes in  Nigeria. It  is unlikely that the public supply of electricity will improve
dramatically  in the near future in Nigeria; the government  should  reap what gains it can from better pricing
policies. In Indonesia,  economic  growth  may by itself  undo many  of the infrastructure  deficiencies  firms now
report; novel changes in pricing policy may be unwarranted.
An ancillary  benefit of the tariff increase  that we recommend  would  be increased  revenues  for NEPA.48
If NEPA used these higher revenues to improve the quality of its transmission  system, a further gain in
efficiency  might be realized. The suggested  pricing schedule  would offer additional  benefits in the form of
business  and  job creation  because  smaller  firms, responsible  for most  job creation  according  to previous  Bank
research  (Lee, 1985  and 1989),  will respond  favorably  to lower  electricity  costs and higher quality  electricity
service. Neither higher tariffs as a source of revenue nor benefits to micro enterprises to spur  job creation
are nearly as important  in Indonesia  as they might be in Nigeria, so long as Indonesia's current economic
boom is providing  both revenues to government  and jobs to workers.
ii) Private firms should be allowed  to sell electricity  to one another. This policy is already in place
in Indonesia.  It should  be implemented  in Nigeria. Large firms produce own electricity  at lower marginal
cost than small firms  do. Allowing  larger firms to sell electricity  to smaller firms near them would improve
economic efficiency. The efficiency gains from such a policy might well be enhanced if firms selling
electricity  to neighbors  put competitive  pressure  on NEPA that resulted  in improvements  in NEPA  electricity
delivery. (Any attempts  to regulate  the prices on intra-firm  sales, or on sales to the public utility, should  be
viewed  skeptically  in the light of Harberger's (1993)  recent welfare  analysis  of electricity  cogeneration  and
sale in Canada.)
iii) The marginal costs of producing own electricity are much higher than the marginal costs of
purchasing  public  power, and probably comparably  higher than the utilities' marginal cost of producing  that
power. Embedded  electricity production encroaches  on firms' productivity  because embedded  production
diverts resources away from primary output. Costly private provision of infrastructure  certainly limits the
growth and expansion of  firms.  Were NEPA and PLN efficient. shifting electricity production from
embedded  production  to NEPA and PLN production  would  harness  the utilities' much greater economies  of
scale. In the long run. firms would reap still larger benefits as they avoided the need to replace their49
generators.  However,  until public  electricity  supply  in these.countries  becomes  more reliable  (and in Nigeria,
far more reliable), it is efficient for government  to encourage  internal  power generation  judiciously.
iv) The Indonesian  government has in recent years encouraged  private electricity production by
offering  tariff reductions  on generators  and by reducing  the import tax on generators. Nigeria  should  follow
Indonesia's lead in this regard. As long as the public provision of electricity remains deficient, oglicies
should  facilitate  firms' efforts to overcome  the inadequacies  of the public system  Easing  price distortions  and
administrative  hurdles on goods that firms use to ameliorate  the costs imposed  upon them by poor public
infrastructure  is one way to lessen  the burden of such remedies.
v) Nigeria should follow the recent lead of Indonesia  and open up the electricity  markets. allowing
third party vendors to participate in the provision of power (and other infrastructure  services as well).
Baumol and Lee (1991) suggest that there may be considerable  efficiency  gains from such efforts to make
infrastructure  markets contestable.REFERENCES
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